This article is part of our The Z Files series.
There are two powerful forces pulling players up the ranks: recency bias and fear of missing out. The two have a common thread as many players fall under both. An example would be a young player showing elite skills in a small sample. Another would be a prospect yet to make his debut but hyped to the nines. Players coming off a breakout campaign also fit the bill.
Many fantasy drafters focus too much on the most recent performance, overlooking sample size consideration or the fact prospects don't have any track record in the majors whatsoever. They're fearful if they don't draft the player at their current turn, he'll be gone by their next pick.
In general, this is a poor reason for drafting a player. I'll discuss this concept further into the drafting season, but each pick comes with a reasonable expectation. Every selection should have a plausible pathway to be worthy of that pick, and plausible doesn't mean if all the stars align and the guy plays to his 95h percentile projection. The reasonable expectation needs to agree with what's anticipated with each pick.
If there isn't a rational chance for the player to warrant the pick, taking him "because he won't make it back to me"
There are two powerful forces pulling players up the ranks: recency bias and fear of missing out. The two have a common thread as many players fall under both. An example would be a young player showing elite skills in a small sample. Another would be a prospect yet to make his debut but hyped to the nines. Players coming off a breakout campaign also fit the bill.
Many fantasy drafters focus too much on the most recent performance, overlooking sample size consideration or the fact prospects don't have any track record in the majors whatsoever. They're fearful if they don't draft the player at their current turn, he'll be gone by their next pick.
In general, this is a poor reason for drafting a player. I'll discuss this concept further into the drafting season, but each pick comes with a reasonable expectation. Every selection should have a plausible pathway to be worthy of that pick, and plausible doesn't mean if all the stars align and the guy plays to his 95h percentile projection. The reasonable expectation needs to agree with what's anticipated with each pick.
If there isn't a rational chance for the player to warrant the pick, taking him "because he won't make it back to me" is a bad idea. So, you don't roster the player. You can still root for him while also cheering for your fantasy team that's better without that player being on your roster.
Other than sample size and limited track record, gravity is working against players repeating strong numbers. Actually, the odds are all players fall back the next season, regardless of quality. This is a study I'll present in greater detail down the line, but here's a condensed version.
The concept is comparing consecutive seasons for qualified players, investigating if their performance/skills improved, declined or stayed the same. Of course, the definition of improved, declined and same is subjective. My scale is as follows:
- Big Improvement: Greater than 50 percent better
- Moderate improvement: Between 10 percent and 50 percent better
- The Same: Between 10 percent worse and 10 percent better
- Moderate Decline: Between 10 percent and 50 percent worse
- Big Decline: Greater than 50 percent worse
For hitters, I looked at players with at least 300 plate appearances for the year, measuring homers per plate appearance and steals per plate appearance. Starting pitchers needed 400 batters faced with strikeout and walk rates the litmus test. In both cases, the players' numbers were normalized against league average to account for the year-to-year global differences.
Here's the results, in terms of percentage of players In each group:
HITTERS
Home Runs
| 2015-2016 | 2016-2017 | 2017-2018 | |
| Big decline | 5.7% | 3.8% | 5.5% |
| Moderate Decline | 38.1% | 42.1% | 38.8% |
| Same | 18.1% | 16.3% | 18.3% |
| Moderate Improvement | 20.5% | 20.1% | 21.9% |
| Big Improvement | 17.6% | 17.7% | 15.5% |
Stolen Bases
| 2015-2016 | 2016-2017 | 2017-2018 | |
| Big decline | 21.4% | 18.2% | 19.6% |
| Moderate Decline | 23.3% | 23.9% | 25.1% |
| Same | 17.6% | 19.6% | 16.0% |
| Moderate Improvement | 13.8% | 9.1% | 14.2% |
| Big Improvement | 23.8% | 29.2% | 25.1% |
In both cases, more players declined than improved. That is, strictly by looking at probability, there's a better chance a player falls back than produces more one year to the next. There's some next-level analysis I'll share in a future piece, especially with respect to the steals data, but for the scope of this discussion, the simple conclusion more hitters decline than improve suffices.
STARTING PITCHERS
Strikeout rate
| 2015-2016 | 2016-2017 | 2017-2018 | |
| Big decline | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Moderate Decline | 35.5% | 24.7% | 37.3% |
| Same | 51.6% | 46.2% | 39.8% |
| Moderate Improvement | 11.8% | 28.0% | 22.9% |
| Big Improvement | 1.1% | 1.1% | 0.0% |
Walk rate
| 2015-2016 | 2016-2017 | 2017-2018 | |
| Big decline | 4.3% | 6.5% | 3.6% |
| Moderate Decline | 35.5% | 33.3% | 30.1% |
| Same | 37.6% | 28.0% | 36.1% |
| Moderate Improvement | 21.5% | 32.3% | 28.9% |
| Big Improvement | 1.1% | 0.0% | 1.2% |
The data for starting pitchers also shows more decline, though it's interesting to note how many are the same with respect to strikeouts. So again, keeping it simple, sheer probability suggests to not be overly aggressive assuming a hurler will post better numbers one year to the next.
With that as a backdrop, here are five players I'm not likely to draft based on the early market.
Don't get me wrong. I recognize Acuna's talent and expect him to be a perennial first round, $30 player, just not yet. His current NFBC (National Fantasy Baseball Championship) ADP is 1.08, with a range of fourth to 16th overall. Obviously, his rookie numbers were impressive, taking home the hardware despite being kept on the farm for a few weeks to open the season then missing a month with a sore groin. It's just that history has taught us to be conservative with our expectations for young players.
From a numbers perspective, I'm most leery of his batting average. He has the power/speed combo to carry an elevated BABIP (batting average on balls in play). As is the case with all young players, I need to see a sustained level of solid contact and Acuna just isn't there yet. His 25.7 percent strikeout clip last season is a bit high. Yeah, I know he won't turn 21 until a week before Christmas, but we're talking about his 2019 ranking, so it doesn't matter if he's young and apt to improve. There's no guarantee he doesn't take a step back before leaping several forward.
My other concern is health. I don't want to punish him for one DL stint, but he's yet to establish durability over a full season. My top-20 hitters average around 670 projected plate appearances. A first-round pick doesn't leave much margin for error. Until I'm comfortable expecting 650-plus trips to the dish, I can't take Acuna over more established hitters.
I was behind the curve on Bregman last season and remain so for 2019. Again, he's a special player, with first-round upside, but not yet worthy of the 10th overall pick, with a range between fifth and 15th. Bregman has established durability and the ability to contribute in all five categories. His plate skills are stellar. My worries lie with quality of contact. His hard-hit rate is around league average, supported by Statcast data, specifically exit velocity and barrels. Again, he's around league average in these measures.
Hitting the ball with less authority than the elite introduces too much variance, as power and average are influenced by the quality of contact. Bregman's home run floor is aided by an above average fly ball rate, but this also tends to negatively affect BABIP since fly balls staying in the yard are generally caught. Until Bregman increases his level of solid contact, he's subject to too much Lady Luck to warrant a mid-first round selection. To put in context, last season, Bregman was the 17th best fantasy player, so he'd need to not only match but eclipse last season's numbers. He has both gravity and numbers working against him.
Currently, Snell is the seventh starting pitcher off the board, generally a late second round pick. Sorry, but that's way too rich for me and my risk-averse philosophy. He absolutely took a huge step forward last season, especially in the control department. The research above suggests Snell will be hard-pressed maintaining his control gains. A different study I undertook reveals pitchers exhibiting improved control tend to give at least some of it back the following season.
I've read and understand all the backward-looking analysis, dissecting Snell's Cy Young campaign. What he did was fantastic, supported by his stuff and usage of four plus pitches. As a coach of mine used to say, "That was great, now do it again." Unfortunately, he didn't say it very much to me. I normally got, "Zola, make yourself useful and coach first base."
Not only does Snell have history working against him, he will likely endure a correction to a low .241 BABIP registered last season. Yes, there's evidence Snell's skills aided a below average BABIP, but that level also was buoyed by some good fortune. There's a domino effect when a hit rate normalizes since most pitchers, including Snell, are less effective working from the stretch. Fewer hits means Snell used the windup more; added hits will put him in the stretch. The end result should be an increase in free passes with a modest decrease of punchouts, sending ratios up a tick or two.
Innings are also an issue for fantasy purposes. The Cy Young voters obviously didn't penalize Snell for "only" throwing 180.2 frames, but unless he joins the 200-inning club, he can't afford too much regression to meet his current draft status. Snell started 31 games, but even giving him one or two more leaves him short of 200 innings, thus he'll need to work deeper into a few games. It isn't clear if the Rays will allow him to do so. Snell is obviously treated as a normal starter and not part of their bullpen approach, but the club is still in tune with analytics and the numbers show Snell suffers the third time through a lineup:
| Time through lineup | OPS |
| First | 0.484 |
| Second | 0.532 |
| Third | 0.729 |
It's not like I'm burying Snell. I have him as the 12th starting pitcher, equating to an SP1 in mixed leagues.
This is the call I'm most confident about. I know Albies is still a pup in baseball terms, but his second-half swoon is being ignored. Granted, some of that swoon is a product of hitting into some bad luck after the break, but a large portion is softer contact, lessening the chance of batted balls becoming hits, not to mention a precipitous drop in HR/FB. His proponents suggest he may have worn down in his first full MLB campaign and with a season under his belt, he'll be better prepared to handle the 162-game grind.
Most point to a huge upside in steals. Albies surely has the wheels to run more. The question is opportunity. There's hope, as the Braves let Ender Inciarte run wild last season, at least over the first half. However, it's not certain Atlanta will green light Albies with mashers Freddie Freeman and now Josh Donaldson following him in the order.
There's another factor working against Albies. Last season, he played in 158 games, amassing 684 plate appearances. He'll be hard-pressed to repeat that lofty total for a couple of reasons. First, he'll need to stay healthy. It's not like he's injury prone, but a lot can happen at the keystone to force a DL stint. The under-the-radar concern is if Albies slumps, he could be dropped in the order, costing him plate appearances. Not only that, if Donaldson is relatively healthy, Johan Camargo will need to find some playing time. Keep in mind Camargo led the club in RBI from June 1 on. It isn't out of the question manager Brian Snitker spells Albies more frequently this season, so he's kept fresh down the stretch and into an anticipated playoff run.
Expending a top-50 pick on the hopes of 25-30 steals is a bet I'm not willing to make. Albies doesn't possess ample power or batting average to serve as a parachute in the event the pilfers don't manifest.
This is less about numbers and more about strategy. You don't need Lord Obvious to warn against expecting another 57-save season, regardless of where Diaz plays next summer. His skills are among the elite, possibly at the top with Craig Kimbrel and Kenley Jansen slipping a tad. He may not repeat last season's 1.96 ERA or 0.79 WHIP, but his expected ratios will still be top among closers.
Despite it being apparent Diaz isn't likely to record another 50-plus saves, his market price reflects the possibility, though some of the inflated cost is from the lack of other elite options relative to other years. That said, I just can't expend a late-third, early-fourth round pick on any closer in today's landscape. Keep in mind, I've long championed the notion of drafting an elite closer in lieu of an ace, but having to do it with a top-50 pick defeats the purpose. There's a noticeable drop in talent just outside the top-50. My preference is to continue accruing at-bats or spending the pick on an ace arm, since that supply is sparse this season.
