The Z Files: Finding Profit At the Margins

There are several pathways to profit. Perhaps the most discussed for drafts is picking a player at or below market value who is expected to deliver more than most everyone anticipates. If said player is relatively unknown, he's deemed a sleeper.

In an auction, it's not only possible to build profit via sage player evaluation, but also via prudent money management. Patience and careful bookkeeping can often avail purchases of players expected to produce more than their cost.

Today, a couple of latent sources of profit will be examined. Neither are secrets; they're both common practices. However, they're usually conducted blind without knowing exactly how much profit is available. Hence, the proper pricing adjustment necessary to maximize return in unclear.

REPLACING AN INJURED PLAYER

We've all done it: draft a player expected to go on the disabled list at least once with the plan to backfill. The theory is it's not the player, but the roster spot being drafted or purchased. The player originally selected is just the first of multiple players to occupy that roster spot. The question is, how many draft spots should be jumped, or how much over cost should be bid on the player?

The reason this is effective is a flaw in conventional valuation. It is assumed each draft-worthy player remains active every day of the season. Obviously, this isn't the case. Regardless of the method, exactly enough players to populate every active roster are assigned positive value. When a replacement is subbed in for an injured player, his stats are free. Replacement has already been accounted for in the pricing of the initial player.

As such, all that needs to be done is adjust the projection of the initial player to account for expected production from the replacement(s), then run this through the pricing algorithm. The result is what that roster spot is projected to earn.

As an example, let's say the original projected price for John Doe was $17. Adding in three weeks of a logical replacement brings the cost to $21. Therefore, anything you pay below $21 is a potential source of profit. If everyone else refuses to pay more than $17, it's possible to chip away at the $60 or so of needed profit to win a typical league.

Relating this to a draft, refer to the table presented a few weeks back in Historical Draft Values. Sticking with John Doe, picks 76-82 are slotted as $17 players. Picks 45-51 check in as $21 options. Ergo, drafting Doe anytime after pick 51 bakes in profit, obviously assuming both Doe and the replacement produce as expected.

Now the conundrum is how to estimate, then price the replacement player. The quality of the player obviously depends on the depth of the league, number of reserves, etc. The earlier in the season, the better the substitute. This is relevant for players expected to start the season on the disabled list, or perhaps in the minors to "work on their defense".

The following is a table with the approximate earnings for each standard rotisserie stat in several common league formats. Keep in mind the exact amount will change every time the player pool changes, meaning the American League and National League numbers are most subject to change since many free agents haven't signed yet. Still, considering round off, they're fine to use as a guesstimate. Since batting average is a ratio stat, the best way to approach it is adding cost for a hit while subtracting for an at-bat.

By means of example, let's say Doe is expected to be out for three weeks over the course of the season. In that span, the replacement goes 18-for-70 with two homers, six runs, seven RBI and a steal. Here's what those stats equate to in the four common league formats:

Fancy that, the added profit in mixed leagues matches the example utilized above. The three weeks of production suggested is a reasonable expectation. Prorate it to a season and we're looking at a .257 batter with around 18 homers, 53 runs, 60 RBI and 10 pilfers.

Obviously, there isn't a one-size-fits-all method as each league is different. Just make the best practical guess you can, keeping expectations reasonable. With round-off in play, using stat values accurate to the penny isn't necessary.

For those wondering, while it's obviously possible to handle pitching in the same manner, it's not worth it from a pragmatic perspective. Pitcher valuations are inherently skewed, assuming there's ample freedom to reserve hurlers in an unfavorable matchup. That is, the entire projection is priced, but chances are you're accruing only a portion of the projection, while the rest happens with the player on reserve. The replacement could be a two-start pitcher, a dominant middle reliever or a closer. There's just too many variables and scenarios to apply a formulaic adjustment.

MULTI-ELIGIBILITY PLAYERS

Building in a flexibility chain is a great way to optimize the active roster each transaction period. Ultimately, the objective is having the ability to start the most productive players and not having a superior player on the bench because there's no available position. Leaving catcher out, the flexibility chain connects all the positions. An example is 2B/SS, 2B/3B, 1B/3B and 1B/OF. Regardless of the position of the better reserve, the above players can be shuffled to maximize roster potential. As an aside, looking at this as a chain highlights why 1B/OF eligibility is just as important as the others. Many eschew the utility of a 1B/OF eligible hitter.

Having this chain, hopefully with redundancy, is especially useful when rostering a solid utility-only player. In fact, this is another way to realize profit, as the likes of Nelson Cruz can usually be rostered at a discount. Tying up the utility spot reduces the ability to have the optimal active roster, possibly giving back some of the expected profit. The chain helps assuage this.

The age-old question is how much should be added to the bid price of a multiple-eligibility player? The principle is the player himself doesn't produce extra stats, but his presence allows extra stats to be added elsewhere, hence the logical means of accounting for that is adding it to the multiple eligibility players.

Let's say prudent roster management adds 10 homers, 10 steals, 30 runs, 30 RBI, 52 hits and 200 at-bats over the course of the season. Here's the corresponding profit for the four formats:

Here's the key. The above totals are not added to each multiple-eligibility player but rather divided between them all. In order to accrue the generous level of stats used in this example, five, perhaps six players need to contribute to the chain. Using six, that means adding $3 or $4 to each player in mixed formats, and a couple bucks in single-league formats. Practically speaking, you aren't going to have to account for this on every player. For every buck you don't have to "overpay", that's a buck towards the goal of $60 profit.

The same auction to draft translation illustrated above applies here.

The proper way to value catchers for drafting purposes is against replacement at the position. In this instance, replacement is already accounted for, so stats from a catcher are the same as those from any other position. A scarcity adjustment isn't needed.

As it turns out, if you're more conservative with your added production, and realistically reduce the target number of multiple-eligibility players, the extra added to each is the same three or four dollars in mixed leagues and buck or two in single formats.

One of the rules-of-thumb with regard to pricing players eligible at more than one spot is adding a buck for each legal position. The math shown here suggests the flexibility is worth more than that, so you may be willing to go the extra buck or draft this type of player earlier than most, yet still realize profit.

There you have it, the quantification of a pair of common drafting ploys. Winning a championship entails deriving profit in multiple ways. Using the amount each individual stat adds to a roster facilitates drafting injury-prone players and those eligible at more than one position.